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abstRaCt
This paper is an attempt to think 
broadly about the transformation of 
religious identity from classical to late 
antiquity, and the part played in that 
transformation by conversion.  Begin-
ning with a simple three-point model 
of religious change, I reconsider A. 
D. Nock’s classic distinction between 
conversion and adhesion.  I argue that 
what really distinguishes classical from 
late antiquity was not the appearance 
of religious choices that offered the 
possibility of a radical reorientation 
in a person’s understanding of the cos-
mos, as Nock implies, but rather the 
development of social structures that 
transformed that possibility into a ne-
cessity, that effectively disallowed ad-
hesion and made conversion the only 
possible type of religious choice.
ResuMen
Este artículo intenta reflexionar en 
profundidad sobre las transformacio-
nes de la identidad religiosa desde la 
Antigüedad Clásica hasta la Antigüe-
dad Tardía, y sobre el papel jugado por 
la conversión en esa transformación. A 
partir de un modelo simple de tres pun-
tos de cambio religioso, reconsidero la 
distinción clásica de A. D. Nock entre 
conversión y adhesión. Sostengo que lo 
que en realidad distingue la Antigüe-
dad Clásica de la Antigüedad Tardía no 
era la apariencia de opciones religiosas 
que ofrecían la posibilidad de una re-
orientación radical en la comprensión 
del cosmos de una persona, como im-
plica Nock, sino más bien el desarrollo 
de estructuras sociales que transforma-
ron esa posibilidad en una necesidad, 
que efectivamente no permitieron la 
adhesión e hicieron de la conversión el 
único tipo de opción religiosa posible.
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This paper is an attempt to think on a large scale about two issues, one 
very broad and the other somewhat more specific, in the religious history 
of the ancient Mediterranean world: the transformation of religious identity 
from classical to late antiquity, and the part played in that transformation 
by conversion.1  Because the transformation of ‘religious identity’ depends on 
the transformation of ‘religion’, I want to begin with a brief discussion of the 
latter.  Some people, and I am among them, would argue that the key devel-
opment in the period under consideration, although one that begins earlier, 
is the development of ‘religion’ as a discrete part of the larger cultural system. 
In classical antiquity, we would say that ‘religion’ was ‘embedded’ within 
other aspects of the culture or perhaps, given recent criticisms of the term 
‘embedded’, that ‘religion’ had no discrete existence at all.2  In late antiquity, 
by contrast, certainly by the year 600 CE, religion had come to exist as a 
separate and distinct part of the larger cultural system.
The development of religion as a discrete part of culture was of course a 
very complex process that resists summary description.  For heuristic pur-
poses, however, I will make an attempt to do just that, and offer a three-point 
summary of what changed, or rather of what exactly I mean when I say that 
religion emerged as a discrete part of the larger cultural system.  First, local 
and ethnic traditions about the nature of the divine and effective means of 
interacting with the divine gradually gave way to discursively elaborated 
systems that were based not simply or even primarily on ancestral tradition 
but rather on exclusive claims to truth.  A particular corollary of this gen-
eral shift is that an emphasis on the correct performance of ritual gave way 
1 I wrote this as the opening lecture for a workshop organized in October 2010 by the 
Velux group at Aarhus University as part of their ongoing research project on �The transfor-
mation of religious identity in the Hellenistic-Roman world from AD 100-600: The signifi-
cance of conversion and initiation to the formation of religious identity”; I owe thanks to the 
group (Anders-Christian Jakobsen, Rubina Raja, Birgitte Bøgh, Carmen Cvetkovic, and Jakob 
Engberg) for their invitation, and to all the participants for their contributions and discus-
sions.  It was also the subject of a work-in-progress workshop at the University of Tennessee 
at Knoxville, and I likewise owe thanks to Tina Shepardson for her invitation and to all who 
took part for their very helpful feedback.  Lastly, I must thank Jaime Alvar for his invitation 
to submit it to ARYS.  In view of the paper’s broad scale, I have made no attempt to provide 
full references to the vast secondary literature; I have included a few references, chosen more or 
less at random, simply for the sake of illustration.
2 For criticisms of the term ‘embedded’, see NONGBRI, Brent: ‘Dislodging �Embedded” 
Religion: A Brief Note on a Scholarly Trope’, Numen 55, 2008, 440-60.
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to an emphasis on the articulation of correct belief.3  Second, a multiplic-
ity of overlapping but largely incommensurate discourses about the divine, 
a situation that some ancient thinkers analyzed in terms of the so-called 
‘three theologies’, were gradually replaced by exclusive and ideally coherent 
systems that aimed at subordinating all these previously separate discourses 
within a single totalizing discourse; an important corollary here is the emer-
gence of a comprehensive form of religious authority.4  Lastly, individual 
choice came to play a much greater role; that is, a more-or-less automatic 
adherence to the ethnic and cultural traditions of one’s people gradually gave 
way to a deliberate choice to adhere to a particular system or group.5  As a 
comprehensive model of religious change from classical to late antiquity, this 
three-point summary is undoubtedly insufficient; I offer it here merely as a 
heuristic device to help bring out some particular aspects of the issues under 
consideration.
What are the implications of this model for the transformation of reli-
gious identity?  In classical antiquity, just as it is difficult to identify any 
discrete segment of culture that we can label ‘religion’, so too it is difficult 
to identify any ‘religious’ identity that is clearly distinct from other forms 
of identity, whether civic, cultural, ethnic, or political.  Obviously, if those 
cultural elements that we would distinguish as ‘religion’ remain dissolved 
within a largely undifferentiated matrix, then there can be no separate ‘re-
ligious identity’.  Perhaps slightly less obviously, in the absence of any to-
talizing discourse there can be no obvious criterion for determining which 
aspects of a person’s ideas about and interactions with the divine are the 
3 Compare STROUMSA, Guy: La fin du sacrifice: Les mutations religieuses de 
l’Antiquité tardive, Paris, 2005, 179, on ‘la nouvelle définition de la religion promue par les 
chrétiens: la religion était maintenant identique à la vérité, en opposition avec toute la tra-
dition, depuis au moins Varron, qui distinguait clairement entre religion et vérité’.  Contrast 
ANDO, Clifford: The Matter of the Gods: Religion and the Roman Empire, Berkeley, 2008, 
13, on the earlier situation: ‘Roman religion was thus founded upon an empiricist epistemol-
ogy: cult addressed problems in the real world, and the effectiveness of rituals—their tangible 
results—determined whether they were repeated, modified or abandoned’.
4 On this development see my more detailed discussion in RIVES, J. B.: ‘Christian Ex-
pansion and Christian Ideology’, in HARRIS, William V. (ed.), The Spread of Christianity 
in the First Four Centuries: Essays in Explanation, Leiden, 2005, 15-41, at 32-8.  On the 
‘three theologies’, see, e.g., LIEBERG, Godo: ‘Die theologia tripertita als Formprinzip antiken 
Denkens’, RhM 125 1982, 25-53, and RÜPKE, Jörg: ‘Varro’s tria genera theologiae’, Ordia 
Prima 4, 2005, 107-29.
5 See NORTH, John: ‘The Development of Religious Pluralism’, in LIEU, Judith, NORTH, 
John, and RAJAK, Tessa (eds.), The Jews among Pagans and Christians, London, 1992, 
174-93, especially 178: ‘the basic story proposed by this chapter is one of development from 
religion as embedded in the city-state to religion as choice of differentiated groups’.  Cf. 
NORTH, John: ‘Refléxions autour des communautés religieuses du monde gréco-romain’, in 
BELAYCHE, Nicole, and MIMOUNI, Simon Claude (eds.), Les communautés religieuses 
dans le monde gréco-romain, Turnhout, 2003, 337-47, and STROUMSA, La fin du sacri-
fice, ch. IV: ‘De la religion civique à la religion communautaire’.
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ones that actually define his or her ‘religious identity’.  As an illustration, we 
may consider an emblematic figure from the beginning of the period under 
discussion.  Plutarch was a follower of Plato, a lover of Homer, a priest of 
Apollo at Delphi, possibly an initiate in the mysteries of Isis, undoubtedly a 
participant in imperial cult, and much more.  Which of these determined his 
‘religious identity’? Plutarch himself, if we could have asked him about his 
religious identity in such a way that he would have been able to understand 
the question, might well have responded by saying that he demonstrated his 
love and respect for the gods in the proper way, primarily through a correct 
understanding of their nature but also by maintaining the traditions of his 
ancestors.6  That is, I suspect that he would not have been able to answer 
our question in the terms that we would want to pose it, by pointing to a 
discrete part in his larger cultural identity to which a distinctive label could 
be attached.
If we consider an emblematic figure from a later period, we find some-
thing very different.  The emperor Julian would probably have understood 
himself to be doing much the same thing as Plutarch: maintaining, with 
a correct understanding, the traditions of his ancestors with respect to the 
gods.  But he, I think, would have had much less difficulty than Plutarch in 
answering our question in the terms in which we posed it: he would simply 
have responded that he was a Hellenist.  The very fact that he could have 
provided a succinct label for the beliefs and practices that he upheld would 
mean that he viewed them in very different terms: as something that cohered 
as a system, and a system separable in analysis, if not necessarily in practice, 
from his broader cultural or ethnic or political identity: to be a Hellenist was 
not necessarily the same thing as being a Hellene.7  The availability of a sepa-
rate label for one’s religious identity has further implications as well.  Julian’s 
self-identification as a Hellenist would have as its necessary correlative the 
implication that he was not a Christian (or a Galilean, to use Julian’s own 
preferred term), which, of course, is what he originally identified himself 
as.  Indeed, by Julian’s time there was a rich set of mutually exclusive labels 
for religious identity that derived much of their meaning through their op-
position to one another: Hellenist, Christian, and Jew, and beyond that, the 
intricate and ever-changing battery of names that Christians used to brand 
each other as heretics and schismatics.  The existence of this set of labels, and 
the set of discrete religious identities to which they were attached, is what 
6 On Plutarch and religion, see, e.g., BRENK, Frederick E.: ‘An Imperial Heritage: The 
Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia’, ANRW II.36.1, 1987, 248-349, and GALLO, Italo 
(ed.): Plutarco e la religione, Naples, 1996.
7 On Julian and religion, see, e.g., SMITH, Rowland: Julian’s Gods: Religion and Phi-
losophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the Apostate, London, 1995; on this use of 
‘Hellenist’ and related terms, see BOWERSOCK, Glen W.: Hellenism in Late Antiquity, Ann 
Arbor, 1990, 10-11.
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made it possible for Julian to convert, that is, to change from being a ‘Chris-
tian’ to a ‘Hellenist’.
It is the development of religion as a discrete element of culture to which 
a distinctive label could be attached, and as a totalizing system that required 
the rejection of any beliefs and practices that it had not incorporated, that 
separates the experience of Plutarch from that of Julian, and it is that devel-
opment that I have, for heuristic purposes, tried to summarize in my three-
point model.  The specific issue with which this paper is concerned falls 
under the third of my three points.  That is to say, conversion and initiation 
result primarily from personal choice.  In saying this I do not mean that 
larger social and cultural factors play no part in the process and that the au-
tonomous will of the individual is the only thing that matters; I simply mean 
that conversion necessarily involves some degree of active assent on the part 
of the person involved.  It is accordingly important that I be very clear about 
the precise role of religious choice in my model of religious change.  It is not 
that the possibility of religious choice came to exist where it had not existed 
before; on the contrary, religious choice of a certain sort is an inherent fea-
ture of Graeco-Roman culture more or less as far back as our evidence goes. 
Rather, what changed was the kinds of religious choices that could be made. 
It is in this regard that I think Nock’s classic distinction between conversion 
and adhesion can fruitfully be reexamined.
Nock defines conversion as ‘the reorientation of the soul of an individual, 
his deliberate turning from indifference or from an earlier form of piety to 
another, a turning which implies a consciousness that a great change is in-
volved, that the old was wrong and the new was right’.  Adhesion, in con-
trast, is merely ‘an acceptance of new worships as useful supplements and not 
as substitutes’, and thus a choice that ‘did not involve the taking of a new 
way of life in place of the old’.8  It is clear even from these brief quotations 
that Nock takes the inner experience of the individual as the measure for 
distinguishing conversion from adhesion: conversion is a religious choice that 
results in profound implications for a person’s understanding of the cosmos 
and his/her role within it; adhesion is a religious choice that does not result 
in profound implications.  Yet Nock was also aware of the importance of the 
larger external structures that shape individual experience, and in fact devel-
oped his distinction between conversion and adhesion within the framework 
of a more general dichotomy between two ideal types of religion, which he 
labels ‘religions of tradition’ and ‘prophetic religions’.  ‘Exclusiveness of re-
ligion’, he observes, ‘is confined to the prophetic type, and it is natural that 
there should be give and take outside it’;9 that is, when people in one cultural 
8 NOCK, A. D.: Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the 
Great to Augustine of Hippo, Oxford, 1933, 7.
9 NOCK, Conversion, 3 and 6.
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tradition encounter the religious practices and beliefs of another tradition 
as the result of political or economic developments, they are free to adopt 
whatever seems useful or appealing without that choice entailing further 
consequences for their world-view or way of life.
I would like to develop this structural aspect of Nock’s conversion/adhe-
sion model further by reconsidering it within the framework of my own 
three-point model of religious change.  In terms of my model, the kind of re-
ligious choice that Nock labels ‘conversion’ requires the existence of systems 
that make exclusive claims to truth and at least aim at functioning as total-
izing discourses; in such a context, any choice requires both the acceptance 
of an entire set of beliefs and practices and simultaneously the rejection of 
all other options not included therein.  On the other hand, in the absence of 
totalizing systems with exclusive truth-claims, people can much more easily 
adopt any particular practice or belief that seems useful or attractive in a sort 
of mix-and-match process, and they can do so because virtually nothing that 
they adopt requires as a necessary corollary that they adopt or abandon any 
other particular practice or belief; this is Nock’s ‘adhesion’.  In terms of the 
model that I’ve sketched, then, conversion and adhesion represent the types 
of religious choices that are possible within two very different contexts: one 
characterized by a variety of ethnic and cultural traditions and a multiplicity 
of overlapping discourses with limited truth claims, and one characterized 
by mutually exclusive totalizing systems with absolute claims to the truth. 
The former, as I have already suggested, is by and large the type of religious 
choice that existed in classical antiquity, and the latter that which existed in 
late antiquity.
With this analysis in mind, I want now to consider adhesion in more 
detail, and to evaluate the implications that religious choice might have had 
for religious identity in classical antiquity.  As I have already observed, reli-
gious choice of a certain sort is an inherent feature of Graeco-Roman culture 
pretty much from its beginnings.  That is, people were generally free to 
choose which deity to worship in which context and by which means, and 
free likewise to consult and adopt the recommendations of various figures 
who claimed expertise in some aspect of religious lore.  There were of course 
certain constraints on this freedom of choice, both formal and informal.  In-
formally, there was the weight of tradition: certain practices had become 
customary in certain circumstances, and most people in most contexts would 
not lightly abandon them in favor of something new and untried.  Formally, 
there were the constraints of social and economic power: people were not 
simply individuals, but were also members of one or more hierarchically 
structured communities, above all the family and the political community. 
The latter was of particular importance.
Some scholars have suggested that the religious institutions of the politi-
cal community themselves functioned almost as a totalizing system, which 
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marginalized or subordinated all other elements of religious life; this is often 
described as the ‘polis religion’ or ‘civic religion’ model of classical Greek and 
Roman religion.10  In the past fifteen years this model, sometimes labeled 
the ‘new orthodoxy’, has been subject to substantial criticism, with some 
scholars rejecting its validity altogether.11  I am myself not convinced that the 
model of ‘polis religion’ has ever constituted an orthodoxy, and I continue to 
regard it as a highly useful tool for bringing out some of the key differences 
between the place of religion in the ancient Mediterranean and in modern 
western culture.  At the same time, the critiques have rightly emphasized 
that, like all models, it tends to reduce complex realities to simplified ideal 
forms which, unless due caution is exercised, run the risk of becoming sim-
plistic.  In the present case, it is important to remember that although the 
religious structures of political communities constituted an important and 
even predominant element in people’s religious lives, they nevertheless left 
plenty of room for personal choice.  Two interrelated points are worth em-
phasizing.  One, often noted, is that there was no structure of authority 
that had a monopoly on interactions with and conceptions of the divine; 
the other, less often noted but no less important, is that the multiplicity of 
different discursive systems meant that there simply could not be a compre-
hensive form of religious authority.  The only authority in religious matters 
backed by something other than its own claims to expertise was in fact pre-
cisely that of the political community, and it tended to be strictly limited: as 
long as public rites were maintained and respected, people were free to avail 
themselves of other resources as they saw fit, and to think as they pleased 
about the nature of the divine and the meaning of religious rituals, including 
even that of the public rites themselves.  
10 See especially on the Greek side SOURVINOU-INWOOD, Christiane: ‘What is Polis Re-
ligion?’ and ‘Further Aspects of Polis Religion’, in BUXTON, Richard (ed.), Oxford Readings 
in Greek Religion, Oxford, 2000, 13-37 and 38-55, first published in 1990 and 1988 respec-
tively.  On the Roman side, see the concise statements in BEARD, Mary, and CRAWFORD, 
Michael: Rome in the Late Republic, Ithaca, NY, 1985, 25-39 and SCHEID, John: Religion 
et piété à Rome2, Paris, 2001, 29-34, first published in 1985; for more detailed studies, see 
BEARD, Mary, NORTH, John, and PRICE, Simon: Religions of Rome, Vol. 1: A History, 
Cambridge, 1998, and RIVES, J. B.: Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Au-
gustus to Constantine, Oxford, 1995.
11 See, e.g., BENDLIN, Andreas: ‘Peripheral Centres—Central Peripheries: Religious Com-
munication in the Roman Empire’ and WOOLF, Greg: ‘Polis-Religion and its Alternatives in 
the Roman Provinces’, both in CANCIK, Hubert, and RÜPKE, Jörg (eds.), Römische Reich-
sreligion und Provinzialreligion, Tübingen, 1997, 35-68 and 71-84, and BENDLIN, An-
dreas: ‘Looking Beyond the Civic Compromise: Religious Pluralism in Late Republican Rome’, 
in BISPHAM, Edward, and SMITH, Christopher (eds.), Religion in Archaic and Republican 
Rome and Italy, Edinburgh, 2000, 115-35; note also the response of SCHEID, John: Quand 
faire, c’est croire: Les rites sacrificiels des Romains, Paris, 2005, 125-9.  On the Greek side, 
see the balanced assessment of KINDT, Julia: ‘Polis Religion: A Critical Appreciation’, Kernos 
22, 2009, 9-34.
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The absence of any monopoly on religious authority, and even of any 
framework that would allow for a single comprehensive form of religious au-
thority, meant that there was ample room for competition among the vari-
ous individuals and groups that claimed some privileged knowledge about 
or access to the world of superhuman powers.  It is in order to highlight 
this aspect of religion in classical antiquity that some people employ the 
metaphor of the ‘religious market-place’, a metaphor that to me seems very 
useful.12  Whether the choices that people made in this ‘religious market-
place’ could fairly be described even in terms of Nock’s ‘adhesion’, however, 
is a real question.  Consistent and marked devotion to a particular deity or 
to a particular technique of accessing divine power would no doubt have 
had implications for a person’s self-conception.  But if we want to take seri-
ously the implications of the ‘religious market-place’ metaphor, we ought 
to conclude, I think, that most of these choices would have contributed no 
more to a person’s identity in antiquity than preferences for certain brands 
of consumer goods do today: that is, a little bit, but not a lot.  My father, for 
example, had a preference for Chrysler automobiles, but if asked to identify 
himself I very much doubt that ‘Chryslerian’ would have been the first thing 
to occur to him.  This may seem like a reductio ad absurdum, and of course 
in some ways it is, but it is not in fact meant as a criticism of the ‘religious 
market-place’ metaphor.  On the contrary, I think that one of the valuable 
things about that metaphor is that it reminds us that not all religious choices 
need have any significant impact on a person’s identity.
Were there any religious choices in classical antiquity that had a poten-
tially greater impact on religious identity?  Turning again to Nock, we may 
consider the three sorts of choices that he singled out as significant in this 
respect.  The first of these was the choice to become initiated into one of the 
so-called ‘mystery religions’ that developed out of the fusion of Greek and 
Near Eastern traditions.  Nock in fact devoted about half his book to these 
cults, tracing their development and analyzing their success in the Graeco-
Roman world; he nevertheless concluded that, at least in the vast majority 
of cases, participation in these cults was simply another form of adhesion, 
without ‘any marked spiritual reorientation, any recoil from [one’s] moral 
and religious past, any idea of starting a new life’.  At the same time, he 
allowed that under ‘special personal circumstances’ such adhesion could ‘ac-
quire the emotional values of conversion’, and cited as the prime example 
12 See for example BENDLIN, ‘Beyond the Civic Compromise’, 134-5 and BECK, Roger: 
‘The Religious Market of the Roman Empire: Rodney Stark and Christianity’s Pagan Competi-
tion’, in VAAGE, Leif E. (ed.), Religious Rivalries in the Early Roman Empire, Waterloo, 
ON, 2006, 233-52.  Note that NORTH, ‘Religious Pluralism’, 178-9, uses the metaphor in a 
very different sense, to describe the competition between discrete and mutually exclusive sys-
tems that characterized the religious landscape of late antiquity.  
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Apuleius’ account of Lucius’ turn to Isis in his Metamorphoses.13  Although 
Nock notes that Lucius’ newfound devotion does not preclude his participa-
tion in other cults, he affirms that it must make any other worship seem 
‘tame and inferior’, and compares Lucius’ story to that of ‘a man received into 
the Catholic Church’ who ends by ‘becoming a member of the Third Order 
of St. Francis’.14  Nock, as always, focuses here on intensity of emotional ex-
perience and personal commitment, but I would like to direct our attention 
instead to the conceptual organization of these cults.
The extent to which the mystery cults of the Hellenistic and imperial 
periods constituted a fundamental departure from Graeco-Roman tradition 
remains a subject of much debate.  Although Nock was writing at a time 
when the study of ancient mysteries was dominated by Cumont and Re-
itzenstein, both of whom in their different ways believed that ‘oriental mys-
tery religions’ constituted a radical innovation in ancient religion, he seems 
largely to have rejected their views, as suggested by his reluctance to regard 
participation in these cults as anything more than a form of adhesion.15  In 
this respect he anticipated what in recent decades has become the commu-
nis opinio, namely, that, as Jan Bremmer recently put it, ‘these so-called 
religions were just cults with a little exotic tinge’.16  The whole practice of 
mystery initiations has long been known to have been Greek in origin, and 
not ‘oriental’, and there is very little evidence that initiation into the major 
Greek mysteries, for example that of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis, had much 
more impact on a person’s identity than any other choice made in the ‘reli-
gious market-place’. 
At the same time, it is probably a mistake to regard the orientalizing 
mystery cults of Hellenistic and imperial times as no different from the old 
mysteries of Demeter and Kore.  Jaime Alvar has recently made a vigorous 
case, against the communis opinio, that the cults of Cybele, Isis, and Mithras 
do deserve to be called ‘religions’; in his view, they all supplied full versions of 
the essential sub-systems that comprise a religion: a system of beliefs about 
the cosmic, human, and eschatological orders; a system of values and eth-
13 NOCK, Conversion, 138.
14 NOCK, Conversion, 155.
15 For Cumont, see especially CUMONT, Franz: Les religions orientales dans le pa-
ganisme romain4, Paris, 1929, first published in 1906; for assessments of Cumont’s intellec-
tual context and influence, see the introduction by Corinne BONNET and Françoise VAN 
HAEPERIN to the recent reissue of Les religions orientales (Turin, 2006) and the papers 
in BONNET, Corinne, PIRENNE-DELFORGE, Vinciane, and PRAET, Danny (eds.): Les 
religions orientales dans le monde grec et romain: Cent ans après Cumont (1906-2006). 
Bilan historique et historiographique, Brussels, 2009.  For Reitzenstein, see REITZEN-
STEIN, Richard: Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen nach ihren Grundgedanken 
und Wirkungen3, Leipzig, 1927, first published in 1910.
16 BREMMER, Jan: The Rise of Christianity through the Eyes of Gibbon, Harnack, 
and Rodney Stark, Groningen, 2010, 56.
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ics; and a system of ritual practice.17  If Alvar’s analysis is correct, then the 
choice to participate fully in these cults would have had significantly more 
implications for the way that a person viewed the cosmos and conducted his 
or her life than the choice to make a vow to Minerva Medica or seek the aid 
of a particular ritual specialist.  Note that I specify the choice to participate 
fully; people could of course invoke the power of these deities for particular 
purposes just as they could exploit any of the other options available within 
the religious market-place.  But for those who wished, these cults appar-
ently offered an entire way of life.  In that respect, they approached the sort 
of totalizing discursive system that I sketched at the start of my talk, and 
made strong if not strictly exclusive claims to truth; the choice to adhere to 
them would thus at least have approximated conversion, in the terms that I 
outlined above.  
The second kind of religious choice that Nock singles out was the choice 
to devote oneself to philosophy.  Nock puts great stress on the fact that 
the philosophical schools of classical antiquity were not merely intellectual 
systems but more importantly ‘offered a life with a scheme’; whereas the 
mystery cults merely ‘evoked a strong emotional response and touched the 
soul deeply for a time’, ‘philosophy was able both to turn men from evil and 
to hold before them a good, perhaps never to be attained, but presenting a 
permanent object of desire to which one seemed to draw gradually nearer’.18 
Here again, more clearly and less controversially, we can observe a choice 
that at least potentially had much greater implications for a person’s under-
standing of the cosmos and way of life.  The idea that ancient philosophy 
was above all a way of life is I think widely accepted, and has in recent dec-
ades been developed most systematically by Pierre Hadot, who locates what 
he describes as ‘spiritual exercises’ at the heart of ancient philosophy.19  Ap-
plying my model, we might observe that philosophers also made exclusive 
truth-claims and treated philosophy as a totalizing discourse.  That is, they 
claimed to hold the key to a correct understanding of other types of reli-
gious discourse such as myth and ritual, and thus to be the only ones able to 
unlock their true value; they likewise claimed to rise above particular ethnic 
and cultural traditions and provide access to universal truth, even if from our 
vantage point these claims seem instead a form of cultural hegemony.20  We 
17 ALVAR, Jaime: Romanising Oriental Gods: Myth, Salvation and Ethics in the 
Cults of Cybele, Isis and Mithras, trans. and ed. Richard GORDON, Leiden, 2008; first 
published as Los misterios: Religiones “orientales” en el Imperio Romano, Barcelona, 2001.
18 NOCK, Conversion, 167 and 185.
19 See especially HADOT, Pierre: Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, Paris, 1995, and 
Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique2, Paris, 2002, first published 1981.
20 See, e.g., RICHTER, Daniel S.: ‘Plutarch on Isis and Osiris: Text, Cult, and Cultural 
Appreciation’, TAPhA 131, 2001, 191-216, on Plutarch, and SCHOTT, Jeremy M.: Christian-
ity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity, Philadelphia, 2008, 52-78, on 
Porphyry.
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may add that a succinct label was available for this identity, one used both 
by philosophers themselves and by non-philosophers, and that a typical look 
or style was associated with it.  In all these respects, philosophy provided 
the closest approximation in classical antiquity to the idea of religion as a 
discrete element within a culture.  Yet as with mystery cults, people were 
free to use philosophy for particular purposes without necessarily accepting 
all its implications; that is, they could treat it as simply another of the goods 
on offer in the religious market-place rather than exploiting its potential for 
the reorientation of their souls.
The third kind of religious choice on which Nock focused was conver-
sion to Christianity, which to some extent was the implicit paradigm for the 
model of conversion with which he was working.  For Nock, Christianity, 
along with Judaism, really did provide something fundamentally different 
from the other religious options available in classical antiquity.21  His focus on 
conversion to Christianity as a ‘reorientation of the soul’ is of course justifi-
able on many grounds, not least the fact that this is how most early Christian 
sources present it.  Yet as a range of scholars have argued more recently, that 
is only part of the story; in many cases an individual’s choice to worship the 
Christian god could well have been, or at least started as, something much 
more like Nock’s adhesion.  On the one hand, in some cases it might simply 
have been a decision to worship a god who seemed to deliver more than his 
competitors; on the other, factors such as participation in a pre-existing so-
cial network may have been more important than individual commitment to 
a set of beliefs.22  In some cases, apparent ‘converts’ to Christianity may have 
gradually come to realize that their choice involved implications that they 
did not in fact want to accept; this may be one explanation for the ‘former 
Christians’ that we start to hear about as early as the letters of Pliny (Ep. 10. 
96.6).  In other words, we may reasonably guess that some people, perhaps 
many, were surprised to discover that the choice to worship the god of the 
Christians was not the same as other choices in the religious marketplace, 
21 He thus, for example, resisted the long-standing scholarly trend to interpret Christian 
sacraments in terms of the ritual practices of the mystery cults; see NOCK, A. D.: ‘Hellenistic 
Mysteries and Christian Sacraments’, in his Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. 
Zeph STEWART, Oxford, 1972, 791-820, first published in 1952.
22 See, for example, MacMULLEN, Ramsay: Christianizing the Roman Empire, A.D. 
100-400, New Haven, 1984, 25-42, who emphasizes the power of the Christian god, and 
STARK, Rodney: The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History, Princeton, 
1996, who emphasizes a variety of social factors, particularly the importance of pre-existing 
social networks; for a balanced assessment of Stark’s contribution, see BREMMER, The Rise of 
Christianity, 45-58, and especially 61 for the importance now widely conceded to social net-
works.  On social networks, see also WHITE, L. Michael (ed.): Social Networks in the Early 
Christian Environment: Issues and Methods for Social History (Semeia 56), Atlanta, GA, 
1992, and the stimulating analysis of McCARTHY, J. C.: ‘Modalities of Belief in Ancient 
Christian Debate’, JECS 17, 2009, 605-34.
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that it required the acceptance of a comprehensive set of beliefs and practices 
and the rejection of all other options.  As far as we can determine, most early 
Christians apparently insisted that a person either commit fully or not be 
a Christian at all; there was no middle ground.  As Paul put it, ‘you cannot 
drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of the demons’ (1 Cor. 10: 21).
This brief reconsideration of mystery cults, philosophy, and Christian-
ity allows us to identify an important aspect of religious choice that Nock’s 
emphasis on individual experience obscures.  All three made possible the kind 
of religious choice that he characterizes as conversion, since all three offered 
totalizing systems based on exclusive truth-claims that included a distinc-
tive world-view and way of life.  But only in the case of Christianity was 
conversion not just a possibility but a necessity; only Christianity required 
all-or-nothing, not mix-and-match.  What was different about Christianity? 
In an earlier paper I tried to answer this question by analyzing Christian 
ideology in terms of its unique interweaving of exclusivity, homogeneity, 
and totalization.23  An ideology, however, does not exist in the abstract, but 
instead consists in specific social practices.  In order to explore this aspect of 
the question, I want to return briefly to a consideration of our overall topic, 
the transformation of religious identity.
As attentive readers will have noticed, although I began with a model for 
the transformation of religion, I did not discuss what I mean by ‘identity’.  I 
have instead simply been assuming an implicit equation of identity with a 
person’s world-view and way of life.  Now embedded in the noun ‘identity’ 
is the idea of ‘sameness’: the quality of identity lies in being the same, idem, 
as some other thing.  But what other thing?  Two main possibilities seem 
to exist.  On the one hand, a thing can be the same as itself at another time: 
although context and attributes may change, the thing remains fundamen-
tally the same over time.  When referring to people, we may distinguish this 
type of identity as personal identity.  It is this meaning of identity that is 
implicit in Nock’s characterization of conversion as ‘a turning which implies 
a consciousness that a great change is involved’: what distinguishes conver-
sion from adhesion is precisely the fact that the person does not remain the 
same over time, but changes.  Nock, then, defines conversion as in essence a 
change in personal identity, and it is that definition that ultimately limits 
his analysis.  The other way of understanding identity is to relate a thing to 
something else entirely: in this case, identity consists in one thing being the 
same as another.  When referring to people, we may distinguish this type of 
identity as social or communal identity; it requires the existence of people 
other than oneself to be the same as (as well as people who are not the same 
but different).  I would propose that we can answer the question of why, in 
the context of Christianity, conversion became the only possible type of re-
23 RIVES, ‘Christian Expansion’.
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ligious choice only if we think about the implications of religious choice for 
communal identity as well as personal identity.
In order to do this, we need a way to model different types of communi-
ties.  Again, merely for heuristic purposes, I will offer a very simple frame-
work consisting of three polarities: a group can be either loosely or strictly 
structured; it can be seamlessly integrated into the wider society or sharply 
opposed to it; it can either be limited to one locality or have a wider, trans-
local dimension.  If we apply this framework to the three types of religious 
choice on which Nock focused, we can immediately identify some signifi-
cant differences.  In terms of their internal structure, mystery cults evidently 
varied; the norm in the cult of Mithras seems to have been the small, strictly 
regimented, and hierarchical group; the cults of Isis and Cybele, on the other 
hand, seem to have allowed for larger and more fluid groups of worshippers 
in addition to smaller and more strictly organized bodies.  The relationship 
between mystery cults and the wider society also seems to have varied.  We 
can easily point to various markers of difference, such as the shaved head that 
Lucius proudly sports at the end of the Metamorphoses (11.30).  Yet Lucius 
also claims to be making a good income as an advocate in the law-courts, 
suggesting that his shaved head did not hinder his effective integration into 
wider society.  As Richard Gordon argued in a classic paper, there are good 
reasons to think that the cult of Mithras, which might seem radically dis-
tinct from wider society, in fact reinforced rather than subverted some of 
its core values.24  Lastly, all these cults seem to have been strictly local in or-
ganization.  Although we may reasonably postulate some degree of fellow-
feeling among devotees of Isis or Mithras or Cybele, there was apparently 
no attempt to expand on that fellow-feeling through any kind of translocal 
organization or communicative practices.25
Turning to philosophy, we may reasonably ask whether philosophers can 
be said to have formed communities at all.  To be sure, certain sects at certain 
points of their history did form closely knit communities, most notably Py-
thagoreans in the archaic period and Epicureans in the Hellenistic and early 
imperial periods; in the later imperial period we can point to such groups as 
the disciples of Plotinus or those of Iamblichus.  But as these later examples 
clearly indicate, philosophical groups tended to cohere around a particular 
teacher and to depend upon him for their community identity; the death of 
the teacher usually signaled the dissolution of the community.26  An identity 
as a philosopher seems accordingly to have been primarily a matter of self-
24 GORDON, Richard: ‘Mithraism and Roman Society: Social Factors in the Explanation 
of Religious Change in the Roman Empire’, Religion 2, 1972, 92-121.
25 See in general BURKERT, Walter: Ancient Mystery Cults, Cambridge, MA, 1987, 
chapter 2: ‘Organizations and Identities’.
26 STROUMSA, La fin du sacrifice, 205-6, citing FOWDEN, Garth: ‘The Platonist Phi-
losopher and His Circle in Late Antiquity’,  Philosophia 7, 1977, 359-83.
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identification, a personal devotion to an ideal, tied at most to a relationship 
with a teacher and fellow students.
The choice to be initiated into a mystery cult or to devote oneself to phi-
losophy thus did not necessarily involve a person in a distinct community, 
and even when it did those communities were not always organized in such 
a way as to promote a strong sense of communal identity.  Early Christian 
communities, by contrast, generally promoted a very powerful and sharply 
distinct communal identity.  They tended for one thing to be very highly 
structured; although the development of formal structures clearly varied in 
kind and degree from one place to another, the letters of Ignatius and the 
Pastoral Epistles show that in some places they were already well developed 
by the early second century CE.  A century later, the structure of a local 
hierarchy headed by a bishop seems to have been more or less universal.  The 
leaders of Christian communities in turn acted to promote particular mod-
els of identity among the members of those communities.  For example, 
they tended to insist on a radical distinction between Christians and non-
Christians.  Again, the stress that people laid on this idea no doubt varied 
from group to group, especially early on, and even the most separatist groups 
retained some associations with the wider society.27  I would nevertheless 
argue that the prevalent model was one of being in the world rather than 
of it (see, for example, Epistle to Diognetus 5-6).  They also seem from 
the start to have encouraged a strong translocal communal identity.  We 
see this already in the letters of Paul, and it becomes more important over 
time, apparent not only in such practices as the exchange of letters between 
communities and regional meetings of bishops but also in such ideological 
moves as the identification and denigration of heresy.  The notion of Chris-
tians as a separate race was one way of expressing both this strong translocal 
communal identity and the radical distinction made between Christians and 
non-Christians; the language of race and ethnicity, before the emergence of 
religion as a discrete element of culture, was just about the only language 
available to describe the sharply distinct and translocal nature of Christian 
communal identity.28  It was also, of course, language that would have come 
naturally to the early followers of Jesus, who as Judaeans were part of what 
we might want to distinguish as a real rather than a metaphorical ethnos.29
It was because of these distinctive structures of Christian communities, 
27 See for example HARLAND, Philip A.: Associations, Synagogues, and Congrega-
tions: Claiming a Place in Ancient Mediterranean Society, Minneapolis, 2003, 177-237.
28 BUELL, Denise Kimber: Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christi-
anity, New York, 2005.
29 It is worth noting that the distinction made by Judaeans between themselves and ‘the 
nations’ was in many way similar to that made by Greeks between themselves and ‘barbarians’; 
it was the exclusive truth-claims and totalizing tendencies of Judaean tradition in the late Sec-
ond Temple period that gave it a force that the Greek-barbarian distinction lacked.
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and the powerful and radically distinct communal identity that their lead-
ers tended to promote, that the choice to worship the Christian god had in 
most cases either to end in conversion or be abandoned; they did not allow 
for the sort of participation that Nock characterized as adhesion.  With re-
spect to religious identity, then, what really distinguished classical antiquity 
from late antiquity, the world of Plutarch from that of Julian, was thus not 
a change in the inner experience of the individual or even the availability of 
religious choices that entailed profound implications for a person’s world-
view and way of life; it was rather the existence of social structures that 
forced individuals to accept those implications, publicly if not always per-
sonally.  This of course raises a further question: why did what we might 
call the Christian model of religious choice become the dominant one in late 
antiquity?  At this point I must call attention to the fact that the subtitle of 
my paper is ‘models and questions’.  I have presented a number of models, 
and will now conclude with a question.
